feat: central auth channel for clients

This commit is contained in:
James Houlahan
2020-04-01 15:16:36 +02:00
parent 0a55fac29a
commit f239e8f3bf
7 changed files with 227 additions and 193 deletions

View File

@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ import (
"crypto/subtle"
"encoding/base64"
"errors"
"fmt"
"net/http"
"strings"
"time"
@ -122,6 +123,10 @@ func (s *Auth) UID() string {
return s.uid
}
func (s *Auth) GenToken() string {
return fmt.Sprintf("%v:%v", s.UID(), s.RefreshToken)
}
func (s *Auth) HasTwoFactor() bool {
if s.TwoFA == nil {
return false
@ -191,9 +196,16 @@ type AuthRefreshReq struct {
State string
}
// SetAuths sets auths channel.
func (c *Client) SetAuths(auths chan<- *Auth) {
c.auths = auths
func (c *Client) sendAuth(auth *Auth) {
c.cm.getClientAuthChannel() <- ClientAuth{
UserID: c.userID,
Auth: auth,
}
if auth != nil {
c.uid = auth.UID()
c.accessToken = auth.accessToken
}
}
// AuthInfo gets authentication info for a user.
@ -301,13 +313,7 @@ func (c *Client) Auth(username, password string, info *AuthInfo) (auth *Auth, er
}
auth = authRes.getAuth()
c.uid = auth.UID()
c.accessToken = auth.accessToken
if c.auths != nil {
c.auths <- auth
}
c.cm.SetToken(c.userID, c.uid+":"+auth.RefreshToken)
c.sendAuth(auth)
// Auth has to be fully unlocked to get key salt. During `Auth` it can happen
// only to accounts without 2FA. For 2FA accounts, it's done in `Auth2FA`.
@ -403,7 +409,8 @@ func (c *Client) Unlock(password string) (kr *pmcrypto.KeyRing, err error) {
func (c *Client) AuthRefresh(uidAndRefreshToken string) (auth *Auth, err error) {
// If we don't yet have a saved access token, save this one in case the refresh fails!
// That way we can try again later (see handleUnauthorizedStatus).
c.cm.SetTokenIfUnset(c.userID, uidAndRefreshToken)
// TODO:
// c.cm.SetTokenIfUnset(c.userID, uidAndRefreshToken)
split := strings.Split(uidAndRefreshToken, ":")
if len(split) != 2 {
@ -437,22 +444,18 @@ func (c *Client) AuthRefresh(uidAndRefreshToken string) (auth *Auth, err error)
}
auth = res.getAuth()
// UID should never change after auth, see backend-communication#11
auth.uid = c.uid
if c.auths != nil {
c.auths <- auth
}
c.uid = auth.UID()
c.accessToken = auth.accessToken
c.cm.SetToken(c.userID, c.uid+":"+res.RefreshToken)
c.sendAuth(auth)
c.expiresAt = time.Now().Add(time.Duration(auth.ExpiresIn) * time.Second)
return auth, err
}
// Logout logs the current user out.
func (c *Client) Logout() (err error) {
func (c *Client) Logout() {
c.cm.LogoutClient(c.userID)
}
// logout logs the current user out.
func (c *Client) logout() (err error) {
req, err := NewRequest("DELETE", "/auth", nil)
if err != nil {
return
@ -467,23 +470,13 @@ func (c *Client) Logout() (err error) {
return
}
// This can trigger a deadlock! We don't want to do it if the above requests failed (GODT-154).
// That's why it's not in the deferred statement above.
if c.auths != nil {
c.auths <- nil
}
return
}
// This should ideally be deferred at the top of this method so that it is executed
// regardless of what happens, but we currently don't have a way to prevent ourselves
// from using a logged out client. So for now, it's down here, as it was in Charles release.
// defer func() {
func (c *Client) clearSensitiveData() {
c.uid = ""
c.accessToken = ""
c.kr = nil
// c.addresses = nil
c.addresses = nil
c.user = nil
c.cm.ClearToken(c.userID)
// }()
return err
}