fix(BRIDGE-406): fixed faulty certificate chain validation logic; made certificate pin checks exclusive to leaf certs;

This commit is contained in:
Atanas Janeshliev
2025-07-03 16:12:05 +02:00
parent e9ea976773
commit 15880dfe19
7 changed files with 214 additions and 15 deletions

View File

@ -25,8 +25,8 @@ import (
"net"
)
// CheckCertificate returns whether the connection presents a known TLS certificate.
func (p *TLSPinChecker) CheckCertificate(conn net.Conn) error {
// CheckCertificate verifies that the connection presents a known pinned leaf TLS certificate.
func (p *TLSPinChecker) CheckCertificate(conn net.Conn, certificateChainVerificationSkipped bool) error {
tlsConn, ok := conn.(*tls.Conn)
if !ok {
return errors.New("connection is not a TLS connection")
@ -34,14 +34,31 @@ func (p *TLSPinChecker) CheckCertificate(conn net.Conn) error {
connState := tlsConn.ConnectionState()
for _, peerCert := range connState.PeerCertificates {
fingerprint := certFingerprint(peerCert)
// When certificate chain verification is enabled (e.g., for known API hosts), we expect the TLS handshake to produce verified chains.
// We then validate that the leaf certificate of at least one verified chain matches a known pinned public key.
if !certificateChainVerificationSkipped {
if len(connState.VerifiedChains) == 0 {
return errors.New("no verified certificate chains")
}
for _, pin := range p.trustedPins {
if pin == fingerprint {
for _, chain := range connState.VerifiedChains {
// Check if the leaf certificate is one of the trusted pins.
if p.isCertFoundInKnownPins(chain[0]) {
return nil
}
}
return ErrTLSMismatch
}
// When certificate chain verification is skipped (e.g., for DoH proxies using self-signed certs),
// we only validate the leaf certificate against known pinned public keys.
if len(connState.PeerCertificates) == 0 {
return errors.New("no peer certificates available")
}
if p.isCertFoundInKnownPins(connState.PeerCertificates[0]) {
return nil
}
return ErrTLSMismatch